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GENDER BIAS IN A FLORIDA COURT: "MR. MOM' V. "THE POSTER GIRL
FOR WORKING MOTHERS"
I. INTRODUCTION
The year is 1989, and Alice Hector is a lawyer rapidly ascending the
ladder of success.' Robert Young is an architect who was previously in-
volved in several successful business ventures.2 Two years earlier, however,
Young's investments crashed along with the stock market.3 Hector and
Young have been married since 1982, they live in New Mexico, and they
have two young daughters." Hector has just landed a job at a prestigious law
firm in Miami, so she moves there with the couple's two daughters, while
Young stays in New Mexico for four months to sell the family home and
finish several projects.5 Hector hires a live-in nanny to watch the children
until she gets home from work.' When Young joins his family in Miami, he
studies for and passes the Florida contractor's examination.7 Young, how-
ever, is computer illiterate and unable to find a job that does not require
computer skills!9 Young returns to New Mexico to handle remaining busi-
ness matters and visits his dying brother in Arkansas.9 He is away from his
family for a total of fourteen months between 1990 and 1993.1" During one
1. Young v. Hector, 740 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). Hector was work-
ing for a small law firm in 1987, moved to a prestigious mid-size firm in 1989, and became a
partner at one of Florida's largest firms in 1993. See id
2. See id.
3. See id. Prior to the stock market crash, Young had been quite successful; when the
couple was married in 1982, Young's business ventures included a publishing company and a
custom-home building firm. See id. According to Joan Williams, "[i]n its original context,
domesticity's descriptions of men and women served to justify and reproduce its breadwin-
ner/housewife roles by establishing norms that identified successful gender performance with
character traits suitable for those roles." JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY
AND WORK CoNFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 1 (2000). Young's failure in the (stock)
market, where a male is expected to be successful, was clearly at odds with this model.
4. See Hector, 740 So. 2d at 1159. The girls were born in 1985 and 1988. See id. After
the children were born, both parents continued to work so they hired live-in nannies and house
keepers to assist with the children. See id. The children were ages ten and thirteen at the time
of the decision.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 1155.
9. See id. at 1160.
10. See id.
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year Hector spends more than three months away from home on business."
Between their arrival in Miami in 1989 until the fall of 1993, the live-in
housekeeper cares for the children after school. 2 When Young returns to
Miami in the fall of 1993, he is available for the children after school nearly
every day. 3 Hector, meanwhile, has become a partner in one of Florida's
largest firms where her annual salary is $300,000.'" Hector asks for a di-
vorce in the Fall of 1993, but Young continues to live in the home and con-
tinues to care for the children during the day." Hector files for divorce in
May 1995.6
Robert Young and Alice Hector assumed non-traditional roles during
marriage and during child custody proceedings, they were each subjected to
gender biases traditionally reserved for the opposite sex. For example, Hec-
tor was criticized for caring more about her career than her children."
Young, on the other hand, was viewed as a less stable parent because he had
fewer financial resources than his wife." Their case has garnered national
attention largely because it both challenges and perpetuates gender stereo-
types and raises serious questions about the manner in which custody deci-
sions are made. 9
As this Comment will show, gender bias in Florida's courts adversely
affected the Hector/Young family, and on a national level the decision is
harmful to men, women and children." In recent years, numerous states
11. Melody Petersen, The Short End of Long Hours: A Female Lawyer's Job Puts Child
Custody at Risk, NEw YORK TviMEs, July 18, 1998, at D1.
12. See Young v. Hector, 740 So. 2d 1153, 1160 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
13. See id. at 1154. By the Fall of 1993, the couple no longer employed a nanny, but Hec-
tor did hire a housekeeper ("Hattie") "who came to the house each weekday between the hours
of noon and 8:00 p.m. to clean, pick up and babysit the children after school." Id. at 1160. The
children were in school from 8:30 a.m. until 2:00-3:00 p.m. See id. When Young told the trial
court that he was taking care of the children, the court questioned how much he was really do-
ing and the following exchange took place: "[Court]: But you've got a nanny doing that. [Fa-
ther]: No sir, I don't believe you can buy parents. Nannies can pick up. They can drop off.
[The Court]: Why [sic] do you need the nanny for, if you're there doing it?" Id. at 1162.
14. Seeid. at 1160.
15. See id. The guardian ad litem found that Young was "the dominant caretaker during
the day" once the family moved to Miami. Id. at 1155.
16. See id. at 1154. When she asked Young for a divorce, in 1993, Hector cited Young's
refusal to seek gainful employment and his extramarital affair while in New Mexico. See id at
1160.
17. See id. at 1177-78 (Goderich, J., dissenting). The panel's decision, for example, con-
trasted Hector's long hours as a litigator (minimum of 45-50 hours per week) with Young's
involvement in the children's after-school activities (e.g. Brownie troop, soccer, and doctor
appointments). See id. at 1155-56.
18. Seeid. at 1155.
19. See Harriet Johnson Brackey, Custody Battle Pits Mr. Mom, Lawyer Wife, ARIZONA
REPUBLIC, Jan. 19, 2000, at E3. According to Brackey, several players in the drama have ap-
peared in various public fora, including PEOPLE magazine, the BBC, the NEw YORK TIMES, the
NEw REPUBLIC, the Today Show, and Dateline NBC. See id.
20. See Krista Carpenter, Comment, Why are Mothers Still Losing: An Analysis of Gen-
der Bias in Child Custody Determinations, 1996 Dwr. C.L. REv. 33, 57 (1996) (arguing that
[Vol. 37
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have commissioned studies confirming that gender bias permeates court-
rooms across the United States.2' Frequently, this gender bias is the result of
traditional gender stereotypes:
In no greater sphere do these outdated gender roles persist than in our na-
tion's family court system. There, the state frequently not only denies the
capability and desire of many men to participate actively and meaningfully
in the care of their children, but also perpetuates the subjugation of women
as mothers by deeming them weak and incapable of survival without the
support of a man. This state-instituted romantic paternalization of mothers,
combined with the narrowed view of the role of fathers, is largely respon-
sible for the wholesale destruction of the post-divorce, father-child rela-
tionship. Consequently, the state creates increased psychological, educa-
tional, behavioral, and health disorders for children, and crime and
violence for society.22
Clearly, the persistence of gender stereotypes and biases is a major
concern for men, women, and children. While recognizing the breadth of
these concerns, this Comment focuses particularly on gender bias against
fathers in custody cases.'
This Comment assesses how deep-rooted gender bias is set in family
courts, analyzes the underlying laws, and looks to the future to see what can
be done to correct the problem. The Comment also considers how the con-
tinuing debate regarding gender bias sometimes interferes with the best in-
terests of children. Part II discusses Young v. Hector in greater depth, first
by reviewing Florida custody law, then turning to the evolution of the case
through three lengthy stages, and concludes that the courts ultimately de-
"although it would appear on the surface that the gender bias prevalent in the courts only im-
pacts the disputing parents, it is actually the child who becomes the true victim.").
21. See Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study of
State Task Forces, 6 S. CAL REv. L. & WoMEN's STUD. 1 passim (1996). For example, the
Utah study found that many attorneys advise fathers not to seek custody because mothers are
presumed to be better parents. See id. at 61 tbl.10. With regard to women, the Michigan study
found that mothers who appear to be primary caregivers often lose when fathers seek custody
and mothers who pursue a career are considered less fit as parents. See id. at 36-37 tbl.5. In
response, many commissions have made recommendations to reduce gender bias, and as the
various task forces and commissions implement their recommendations, there seems to be a
resulting decrease in gender bias in the courts. See id. at 70-78.
22- See Cynthia A. McNeely, Comment, Lagging Behind the Times: Parenthood, Cus-
tody, and Gender Bias in the Family Court, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 891, 894 (1998); see also
Judith Bond Jennison, The Search for Equality in a Woman's World: Fathers' Rights to Child
Custody, 43 RuTGERS L. REv. 1141, 1142 (1991).
23. While a comparison between bias against both genders would be more ideal, the
scope of such a study was beyond the time and space constraints of this Comment. I therefore
chose to focus on bias against men. (For insight regarding the bias against women using Hec-
tor as paradigm, see Amy Ronner, Women Who Dance on the Professional Track: Custody
and the Red Shoes, 23 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 173 (2000). During the early phases of my re-
search, I was shocked to find that some father's rights groups will use severe tactics to con-
vince the public that men are being treated unfairly in custody decisions. See infra Part IVA. I
hope this Comment contributes something more concrete to the legitimate concerns many fa-
thers have about custody awards.
2000]
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cided this case wrongly. Part III discusses the impact of no-fault divorce on,
and the evolution, of custody law in the United States, from children as
property, to various gender-based presumptions, and finally to the current
best interests of the child standard. Part IV discusses how mothers and fa-
thers often mask the more important issues in custody cases by focusing at-
tention on themselves as victims. The Comment concludes, in part V, by
suggesting ways for improving the manner in which child custody is deter-
mined.
II. THE CASE: YOUNG v. HECTOR
This part will critically analyze the law and the decisions made at each
level of Young v. Hector to show that Robert Young was the victim of gen-
der bias because he assumed a role traditionally reserved for mothers, while
his wife was the breadwinner, a role traditionally filled by fathers.
A. Florida Law
Under Florida law, "[tihe court shall order that the parental responsibil-
ity for a minor child be shared by both parents unless the court finds that
shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child."' Shared
parental responsibility is defined as "a court-ordered relationship in which
both parents retain full parental rights and responsibilities with respect to
their child and in which both parents confer with each other so that major
decisions affecting the welfare of the child will be determined jointly."'
This joint custody presumption must be considered under the framework of
the best interests of the child standard, which is the dominant standard in the
United States. While the parameters of the best interests of the child stan-
dard varies from state to state, most states provide factors to guide courts.27
24. FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13(2) (1999). This is essentially ajoint custody presumption.
25. FLA. STAT. ch. 61.046(14) (1999).
26. See Sylvia A. Law & Patricia Hennessey, Is the Law Male?: The Case of Family
Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 345, 348 (1993); Susan Beth Jacobs, Note and Comment, The
Hidden Gender Bias Behind "The Best Interest of the Child" Standard in Custody Decisions,
13 GA. ST. U.L. REv. 845, 853 (1997).
27. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (1999) ("For purposes of shared parental responsibil-
ity and primary residence, the best interests of the child shall include an evaluation of all fac-
tors affecting the welfare and interests of the child." ). These factors include:
(b) the love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parents and
the child. (c) the capacity and disposition of the parents to provide the child with
food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under
the laws of this state in lieu of medical care, and other material needs. (d) the
length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the de-
sirability of maintaining continuity... (f) the moral fitness of the parents... (i)
the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of suffi-
cient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a preference. i) the
willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and con-
[Vol. 37
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In addition, Florida judges may consider any factor they deem relevant to
their decision," thereby giving the trial judge a great deal of discretion.
Once the custody determination is made, a Florida appellate court may only
reverse for abuse of discretion "where no reasonable man would take the
view adopted by the trial court."29
B. The Evolution of the Case
Those who support Robert Young and Alice Hector" agree on very lit-
tle,3' but they seem to agree that both are good parents.32 According to one
observer, "[t]his is one of those cases where it could have gone either way.
It says that parents' roles are changing, and that's going to have conse-
quences on custody issues."'33 At the time of the divorce, Hector was a work-
ing mother, while Young was an unemployed, self-described "Mr. Mom."'
Though the change in roles might seem to support a custody award to
Young, the guardian ad litem (GAL), Ira Dubitsky, recommended that Hec-
tor be awarded primary residential custody.3" Miami-Dade Judge W. Tho-
mas Spencer"' agreed, and then denied Young's request for permanent ali-
mony, choosing instead to grant him four months of rehabilitative alimony
at $2,000 per month and $10,000 in attorney's fees.37
On June 24, 1998, a three-judge panel (hereinafter "the panel") of the
tinuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent... (I) evi-
dence of domestic violence or child abuse.
FLk. STAT. chs. 61.13(3)(b)-61.13(3)(1) (1999).
28. See Fla. STAT. ch. 61.13(3)(m) (1999) ("Any other fact considered by the court to be
relevant." (emphasis added)).
29. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980). Accord Schoonmaker v.
Schoonmaker, 718 So. 2d 867, 868 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (per curiam).
30. See Young v. Hector, 740 So. 2d 1153, 1158 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). The wife,
Alice Hector, is now using her maiden name. See id.
31. See Editorial, Case Blown Out of Proportion, SUN-SENT4NEL, July 17, 1999, at 12A
(describing how the couples' supporters have made the case a battle between "Mr. Mom" and
the "poster girl for working mothers").
32. See Paula McMahon, Working Mom Gets Kids: Stay-at-Home Dad Blames Gender
Bias in Ruling on Girls, SuN-SENEL, July 15, 1999, at IA.
33. Deborah Sharp, Custody Clash Reflects Parents' Changing Roles, USA TODAY, July
28, 1999, at 5A (quoting Nancy Duff Campbell of the National Women's Law Center).
34. Young, 740 So. 2d at 1161.
35. See id. at 1155. In his report, the guardian ad litem also recommended that Young be
giranted very liberal and frequent access to the children. At trial, Dubitsky cited three "deter-
minative factors" that formed the basis of his decision: (1) the mother was more "economi-
cally stable" over the course of the marriage, (2) the mother's steady presence "over a contin-
u-um of time," and (3) the mother was more able to control her anger in front of the children.
See id. at 1162-63.
36. Although Judge Spencer served in the Florida Legislature with Hector's father, Hec-
tor's father was in the courtroom during the proceedings, yet Spencer did not recuse himself
and Young's attorney never raised the issue on appeal. See Brackey, supra note 19.
37. See Young, 740 So. 2d at 1156.
2000]
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appeals court reversed the decision. 3' Hector then asked the Third District
Court of Appeal for a rehearing en banc.39 Her request was granted and on
July 14, 1999, a full bench of the court of appeals (hereinafter "the bench")
withdrew the panel's decision, affirmed the trial court's custody decision,
but reversed the trial court's decisions regarding property distribution, at-
torney's fees, and alimony.' According to the bench, the alimony awarded
was "inadequate in light of [Young's] rehabilitative plan presented to the
court and the lifestyle established during the parties' marriage"; the division
of property was "inequitable"; and the attorney's fees were "insufficient"."'
In spite of the court's recognition that Young was treated unfairly with re-
spect to property issues, the court rejected the father's suggestion that he
was the victim of gender bias with regard to the custody issue. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion by granting custody to Hector, the bench
concluded, and the evidence did not support Young's gender bias argu-
ment.43 The following sections discuss each decision in greater detail.
1. Round One: The Trial Court
The trial court followed the recommendations of Ira Dubitsky, the
GAL, which portrayed Young as an excellent father." When he testified,
however, Dubitsky cited three "determinative factors" that he used in rec-
ommending Hector as the custodial parent. 5 First, "very clearly, [Hector]
has been the more economically stable of the two throughout the relation-
38. See id. at 1158. The panel consisted of Judges Schwartz, Nesbitt and Goderich, all of
whom dissented when the panel was reversed on rehearing en banc. The panel found abuse of
discretion because the trial judge relied on improper factors, such as economic resources, and
failed to preserve the caretaking roles the couple had established. See id.
39. Brackey, supra note 19. Brackey notes how rare such a request is granted: of 3,487
total cases in 1998, the court granted such hearings only II times. Brackey does not mention
how many requests were made. See id.
40. See Young v. Hector, 740 So. 2d 1153, 1163-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). See also
McMahon, supra note 32 (noting the Court of Appeals must have been "troubled" by the issue
because it "took an unusually long seven months after oral arguments to publish their deci-
sion").
41. Young, 740So. 2dat 1164.
42. See id. at 1162. Neither the panel nor the full bench ever mentioned shared parental
responsibility.
43. See id. at 1153. In 1990, the Report of the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study
Commission concluded that "many of Florida's courts tend to minimize the time, energy, and
lost opportunity required to be a homemaker and primary caretaker of children. The Commis-
sion found the courts especially reluctant to acknowledge these contributions as a genuine
partnership resource of marriage." REP. oFTm SuPREME CT. GENDER BiAs STUD. COMM'N 45
(1990) [hereinafter FLORIDA STUDY]. The bench's decision fits this category.
44. See 740 So. 2d at 1155-56. In the report, Dubitsky wrote that Young is "phenomenal"
with his children, while Hector "tends to be somewhat cooler by nature." Id. at 1155.
45. See id. at 1165 (recommending that Young should have liberal visitation rights be-
cause he "gives a tremendous amount to the kids.").
[Vol. 37
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ship."' Second, Hector was "the more constant factor throughout the entire
relationship,"'7 because Young had been, "for whatever reasons, away from
the home for substantial periods of time and Alice has been the dominant
influence."" Dubitsky's final determinative factor was his opinion that Hec-
tor was better able to control her anger in front of the children.'
A common theme emerges from Judge Spencer's comments at trial and
from the briefs submitted by Hector's attorneys: Young should stop being
lazy and get a job. For instance, Spencer asked Young: "Maybe I'm missing
something. Why don't you get a job?"' According to Hector's court brief, a
typical morning went like this: "Mother wakes up children, picks up the
newspaper, gets the children dressed, feeds them breakfast, makes their
lunch, cleans up the kitchen, feeds the animals, takes garbage and recycling
to street, makes the beds and drives the children to school. Father in bed.'
Hector's attorneys, however, failed to mention that Young started and led a
Brownie troop, "coached one of the children's soccer team, regularly volun-
teered at the children's school, and [took] the children to doctor and dentist
appointments." 52 In addition, one of the children's former pre-school teach-
ers testified that Young made repairs to the classroom, attended field trips,
and participated in various other activities. 3 In contrast, the same teacher
testified that Hector's only involvement was that she dropped the children
off at school approximately eight to ten times during the school year.5
Hector's trial attorney excoriated Young's work ethic in his brief: "The
decision of the highly motivated architect father to spend the rest of his life
doing nothing economically productive was entirely his own. ' 5  These
comments not only evidence bias against Young, but similar attacks could
46. Id. at 1155, 1165 (emphasis added).
47. ld.
48. Young v. Hector, 740 So. 2d 1153, 1162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis added).
Dubitsky clearly did not think Young's reasons for being away were worth considering.
Young's absences, however, included a trip to New Mexico in order to improve the family's
home so they could sell it, handle various business matters, visit his brother who died soon
thereafter, and attempt to make money through a treasure hunt. See id. at 1178-79 (Goderich,
J., dissenting).
49. See Young, 740 So. 2d at 1163 (basing this conclusion on conversations with the chil-
dren and on Dubitsky's own experience seeing Young show his anger in front of the children).
50. Id. at 1176.
51. Petersen, supra note 11. According to Loyola Law Professor Randy Frances Kandel,
"[s]chool age children neither have nor need primary caretakers to wash and dress them. Fur-
thermore, merely because one parent is responsible for the washing, cooking, shopping, and
cleaning, he or she is not necessarily the psychological parent." Randy Frances Kandel, Just
Ask the Kid! Towards a Rule of Children's Choice in Custody Determinations, 49 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 299, 343 (1994).
52. Young, 740 So. 2d at 1155.
53. See id. at 1156.
54. See id.
55. Richard Willing, Stay-at-home Dad Fights to Keep His Kids Closely Watched Cus-
tody Battle Flips Traditional Roles, USA TODAY, July 24, 1998, at 3A. Hector's male attorney
apparently views masculinity as the accumulation of wealth.
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also be lodged against mothers who choose the traditional role of stay-at-
home mom. 6 Further, while a father staying home with the children may
seem'irresponsible if the family was agonizingly poor, the economic situa-
tion in this family was far from dire. Hector was making $300,000 annually
and the couple had always employed a live-in nanny or housekeeper.'
2. Round Two: The Panel
In reversing the trial court's decision, the three-judge panel held that
the trial judge abused his discretion because the decision did not continue
the primary care-taking roles the parties had established. 8 According to the
panel, "[s]uch a continuation would clearly be in the best interests of the
child."'59 In the panel's view, the trial court's decision to grant custody to
Hector did not continue the care-taking roles because Young had been the
primary caretaker for three years and was clearly in the best position to pro-
vide care in the future.'
The panel also criticized the trial judge for blindly relying on Dubit-
sky's recommendation.6 While Florida law provides that "the court may
consider the information contained in the study in making a decision on the
child's custody,"'62 a trial court is not bound by testimony from a custody
evaluator, but is "free to judge the persuasiveness and credibility of that ex-
pert's testimony, in light of the court's knowledge and experience and the
evidence in the case."63 The trial court was further criticized for emphasizing
Hector's economic stability." As the panel correctly pointed out, "the fact
that one parent is the primary care-taker should always outweigh the fact
56. As Young's attorney stated, the court "defines the husband's role as having gainful
employment. What about all the women who take care of their kids at home, are they not gain-
fully employed?" McMahon, supra note 32.
57. See Young v. Hector, 740 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
58. See Young, 740 So. 2d at 1157. While the trial court and bench both concluded there
was no agreement, acquiescence to the situation for a three-year period may be sufficient to
constitute agreement. See id. at 1176 (Nesbitt, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 1157. The panel relied on the PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSoLUIrON:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Part I, § 2.09, 121 (Tentative
Draft No. 3, 1998). However, Florida law also recognizes the importance of continuity. See
FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13(3)(d) (1999).
60. See Young, 740 So. 2d at 1157. Judge Schwartz reiterated this conclusion in his sub-
sequent dissenting opinion: "As the panel opinion, which has not in my view been success-
fully challenged by any of the contrary briefs or opinions, demonstrates, the children's par-
ents, who know and care most about their welfare, had themselves established an arrangement
prior to the dissolution as a part of which, upon any fair assessment, the father was the pri-
mary caretaker." Id. at 1172.
61. See Young, 740 So. 2d at 1157-58.
62. FLA. STAT. ch. 61.20(1) (1999) (emphasis added).
63. Schoonmaker v. Schoonmaker, 718 So. 2d 867, 868 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (per
curiam).
64. See Young, 740 So. 2d at 1162. (noting that the trial court relied heavily on Dubit-
sky's recommendation in that regard).
[Vol. 37
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that the other parent is more financially stable."' If this factor were that im-
portant, significantly higher numbers of men would presently be custodial
parents. A 1986 California Supreme Court opinion, discussing the applica-
tion of the best interests standard, applies equally well to the trial court's
decision in this case:
The [trial] court's reliance upon the relative economic position of the par-
ties is impermissible; the purpose of child support awards is to ensure that
the spouse otherwise best fit for custody receives adequate funds for the
support of the child.... And all of the factors cited by the trial court to-
gether weigh less to our mind than a matter it did not discuss-the impor-
tance of continuity and stability in custody arrangements.6
The trial court in Young, therefore, should have granted custody to
Young and then awarded him adequate child support, thereby maintaining
the emotional stability the children had established with Young as their pri-
mary caretaker.' Instead, the trial court placed undue emphasis on Hector's
superior financial position, thereby reversing the role that gender bias often
plays in custody determinations."
The panel questioned the trial court's reliance on Dubitsky's second
factor as well. Dubitsky used Young's absence as a basis for concluding that
Hector was the more constant factor in the children's lives, but all the trips
Dubitsky mentioned were necessary and all occurred prior to 1993.69 When
Young returned in 1993, he was the primary caretaker from that point until
the couple divorced in 1996.70 The panel thus correctly asserted that provid-
ing continuity and stability could most reasonably be achieved by granting
custody to Young.7' In contrast, both the trial court and the bench minimized
the continuity argument and admonished Young for not getting a job,
thereby ignoring the relationship that Young had developed with his chil-
dren.'
Finally, the third determinative finding of Dubitsky pointed to Young's
inability to control his anger around the children. Yet, several neighbors and
friends testified regarding the parents' respective conduct around the chil-
65. Id. at 1157. See also Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 491 (Cal. 1986) (stating that
economic advantage cannot be the sole basis for awarding custody).
66. Burchard, 742 P.2d at 488.
67. See Young v. Hector, 740 So.2d 1153, 1157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). ( "The record
clearly indicates that the architect [Young], with an adequate amount of child support, would
continue to provide for the children.").
68. See Susan Beth Jacobs, supra note 26, at 857 (arguing that courts typically place too
much weight on fathers' superior economic resources while minimizing the primary caretaker
role that mothers play).
69. See Young, 740 So. 2d at 1178-79.
70. See idL at 1158.
71. See i& at 1157.
72. See id. at 1157 (arguing that Young was very dedicated to the children as demon-
strated by his leading a Brownie troop, coaching one child's soccer team, regularly volunteer-
ing at their school, and taking the the children to doctor and dentist appointments).
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dren, and not one of them mentioned any problems with Young's anger con-
trol despite seeing both parents much more frequently than the GAL. 3
Moreover, Dubitsky's description of Young's anger indicates no violent
tendencies on' Young's part: "[Young] feels economically dependent. He
feels that he is a victim and that he has not been treated right economically
by Alice and has a tendency, although he tries to control it, to verbalize it
more."'7 The fact that Young verbalized his anger in the midst of a divorce
and custody battle hardly seems surprising. Hector was making $300,000
annually, and yet supposedly divorced Young for not assuming his role as
the primary breadwinner." There were no allegations of any physical vio-
lence whatsoever.76 While the trial court, therefore, has wide discretion to
consider any factors, it was wrong to consider anger control as a determina-
tive factor in this case.
3. Round Three: The Bench
In reinstating the trial court's decision, the full bench of the appeals
court repeatedly emphasized that "[t]he simple issue for our consideration is
whether the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that the best
interests of the two minor children dictated that their mother be designated
their primary custodial parent."' In other words, the bench tried to turn the
case into a narrow, technical review in order to avoid the more difficult
analysis required to resolve such a complex, high-profile dispute. The bench
emphasized that a trial court's custody determination "should not be lightly
second-guessed and overturned by an appellate court merely reviewing the
cold-naked record."' The bench had no problem, however, in overturning
the trial court's decision regarding alimony payments and property distribu-
tion, 9 despite the "almost unreviewable discretion" of trial courts under
Florida's equitable distribution statute." Since trial courts have such broad
power to make each of these determinations, the bench's decision to reverse
two of the three decisions is at least questionable. This decision by the
bench provides support for my thesis that gender bias pervades the family
courts, but appellate courts are extremely reluctant to overturn custody deci-
sions.
The bench seemed to recognize the impropriety of Dubitsky's first fac-
73. See Young v. Hector, 740 So. 2d 1153, 1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
74. Id. at 1169 (emphasis added).
75. Hector asked Young for a divorce in 1993 and suggested that one of her grounds for
doing so was Young's refusal to seek gainful employment. See id. at 1160.
76. See generally Young.
77. 1d at 1158.
78. Id. at 1164. (citing that the bench also dismissed Young's contention that gender bi-
ases underlay the trial court's opinion).
79. See id.
80. FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 43, at 7. See also FLA. STAT. ch. 61.075 (1999).
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tor. The bench attempted to explain Dubitsky's reference to economic sta-
bility as having nothing to do with Hector's salary:
We believe, that what the guardian was attempting to convey was that the
mother had shown a proclivity to remain steadily employed, unlike the fa-
ther who unilaterally removed himself from the job market, although he
was employable and the family needed the additional income .... Given a
choice between the mother who maintained constant steady employment
throughout the marriage to support the children (regardless of the amount
of her income), and the father who unilaterally and steadfastly refused to
do the same, the trial court's designation of the mother as custodial parent
cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion8'
Even the bench, however, admitted that "the father actively pursued job
leads in the Miami area prior to the couple's relocation."' Hector did not
have to encourage Young to seek work. He was diligent prior to his move to
Miami and he went on interviews after he arrived. 3 Young emphasized to
the trial court that he was trying to find work, but his lack of computer train-
ing eliminated him from most architectural jobs.'
According to the bench, Hector sought a divorce "because of [Young's]
continued refusal to seek gainful employment and due to his extramarital
affair in New Mexico."' There is no indication, however, that Young was
not seeking employment during this time. He testified that he had gone on
several interviews, but again found that his lack of computer skills pre-
vented him from being considered for most jobs. 6 A more plausible ration-
ale for the divorce is Young's affair, considering Young only had one month
to find a job in an industry that clearly demanded more computer education
than Young possessed.
81. Young v. Hector, 740 So.2d 1153, 1162-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis
added). The bench's attacks were unwarranted because Young's lack of computer skills ar-
guably made him unemployable as an architect. The court also deemed "unreasonable"
Young's desire to stay home with the children rather than seek "gainful employment." Id. at
1163 n.7. Again, the bench bases this conclusion on Dubitsky's report, which states: "[ilt is
my belief that the Husband's plan to remain a full time parent is unrealistic; and although he
rationalizes that things would be different if he were a woman, I don't believe that the Court
would treat a woman with the same background and qualifications any differently from a
man." Id. at 1163. Unfortunately for Young, his attorney's comments during closing argu-
ments did not help him: "Mr. Young's position right now, which we all agree is unreasonable,
is the best for the children. If you were to stay home and be supported and be with the children
and get rid of the housekeeper that would be the best scenario. I don't think that's a fair sce-
nario." Id. Gender bias apparently found its way into Young's camp.
82. See Young, 740 So. 2d at 1159 (emphasis added).
83. See id. at 1162.
84. See Young v. Hector, 740 So. 2d 1153, 1161-62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
85. Id. at 1160.
86. See id. at 1161-62. Young also implied that he planned to get the necessary education:
"Larry Foreman, who was court appointed as the career consultant, anticipated that I should
go to graduate school to acquire these skills that I'm lacking right now. I've gone on inter-
views. They like me. They like what I have to offer but their offices are basically all comput-
erized." Id.
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In Chief Judge Schwartz's view, there was "no question whatever" that
the trial court's decision was based on gender bias:
I believe that this is shown by contemplating a situation in which the gen-
ders of the hard working and high earning lawyer and the stay at home ar-
chitect were reversed, but everything else remained the same. The male at-
torney's claim for custody would have been virtually laughed out of court,
and there is no realistic possibility that the mother architect would have ac-
tually 'lost her children.' ... It is, at best, na've in the extreme to suggest,
let alone find, that the result below was not dictated by the evil of gender
bias.7
Another member of the panel, Judge Goderich, also dissented. Calling
the case "unique," Goderich seemed to sympathize with those who had dif-
ficulty finding the hidden gender bias in the trial judge's determination.
When one parent stays home, he stated, "it is usually the mother." " In this
case, however, it was the father "who has not worked outside of the home
for the past three years in order to care for the minor children."8 While the
situation in Young may be unique, society and the legal system must realize
that men and women are increasingly entering spheres traditionally reserved
for the opposite sex.' The more society recognizes this reality, the easier it
will become to eliminate gender bias from the courtrooms.
II. EVOLUTION OF CHILD CUSTODY LAW
Woe to the father who was incapable offinancially supporting his family,
because he would be deemed a failure not only as a father, but as a man.
... Woe to the mother who did not choose to selflessly and altruistically
place her children above all else, for she would be deemed a failure as a
87. Young, 740 So. 2d at 1173-74 (Schwartz, C.J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 1179 (Goderich J., dissenting).
89. Id. (Goderich J., dissenting).
90. According to Cynthia McNeely, "[w]ith the reemergence of feminism in the early
1970s, many women realized that they needed a man about as much as 'a fish needs a bicy-
cle."' See McNeely, supra note 22, at 893. But see Erin Melnick, Reaffirming No-Fault Di-
vorce: Supplementing Formal Equality with Substantive Change, 75 IND. L.J. 711 (2000).
Melnick argues that:
While the promulgation of gender-neutral laws has helped break down some
traditional gender norms, the law of equal opportunity has not achieved equality
of results. For example, in the employment setting, formal equality has evolved
into a 'separate but equal' doctrine that formally promises equal opportunity in
the workplace, but actually gives rise to 'mommy tracks,' sexual harassment,
and 'Darwinian selection.'
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mother, and as a woman.9'
While this quote was intended to capture the positions of men and
women in the nineteenth century, these views have not drastically changed
with the passage of time. Although scholars may disagree on the actual
number of fathers who seek custody, a closer look at one study suggests that
fathers sought custody in only 8.75% of cases studied over a five-year pe-
riod.' The study did not inquire into possible reasons for such a low num-
ber, thereby ignoring the possibility that gender biases and stereotypes may
discourage men from seeking custody.93 Most divorces involving children
still result in the mother retaining sole custody of the children.94 Such results
suggest gender bias against fathers.
The following section will provide a history of custody law in the
United States, showing how it has evolved from a paternal presumption
prior to the mid-nineteenth century, to a maternal presumption lasting well
into the latter half of the twentieth century, to more recent state law in-
tended to eliminate gender-based presumptions completely. This section
hypothesizes as to why these more recent laws have failed for the most part
to remove gender bias from family courts.
A. Historical Overview: From Father's Property to Mother's Nurturing
Nature
Prior to the nineteenth century, various legal systems gave fathers a
dominant role in their children's lives. 9" Roman society, for example,
viewed children as part of their father's property and, consequently, on di-
vorce, fathers were automatically awarded custody.96 English law also ad-
hered to a paternal preference' and this tradition was imported into the
91. McNeely, supra note 22, at 900-01.
92. See id. at 956 n. 117 (citing a study of 24,000 cases examined by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court comparing custody sought by mothers and fathers, which found that
when fathers sought custody in 2,100 of those cases they received primary custody in 609
cases (29%) and joint custody in an additional 969 cases (65%), whereas mothers received
custody in 93.4% of the 24,000 cases studied). The Massachusetts study concluded, however,
that "fathers who actively seek custody obtain either primary or joint physical custody over
70% of the time." Gender Bias Study of the Court System in Massachusetts, 24 NEW ENG. L.
Rav. 745, 825 (1989) [hereinafter Gender Bias Study].
93. See McNeely, supra note 22, at 910.
94. See Jo-Ellen Paradise, The Disparity Between Men and Women in Custody Disputes:
Is Joint Custody the Answer to Everyone's Problems?, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 517, 518 (1998)(noting that nine out of ten custody decisions favor women and arguing that "[t]he belief that
ohildren belong with their mothers is firmly ingrained within in this country's social and legal
tenets.").
95. See Jennison, supra note 22, at 1143.
96. See Paradise, supra note 94, at 525; Jennison, supra note 22, at 1143.
97. See Debra L. Swank, Comment, Day Care and Parental Employment: What Weight
Should They Be Given in Child Custody Disputes?, 41 VIL. L. REv. 909, 916 (1996). Swank
also notes, however, that divorce was very rare in England at the time. See id.
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United States, as children here were considered their father's property.98
Consequently, it mattered little if the personal relationship between child
and father was less than ideal, as such a notion was irrelevant to the prevail-
ing property-based presumption."
American courts began shifting from a paternal to a maternal presump-
tion in the early nineteenth century." ° While many factors contributed to this
change, the Industrial Revolution played a dominant role because it forced
fathers to seek employment away from home."' As men spent less time at
home, mothers were forced to assume the lion's share of childrearing.'
°
Over time, the "separate spheres" ideology developed.' Accordingly, men
and women were placed in their appropriate spheres: "men 'naturally' be-
long in the market because they are competitive and aggressive; women be-
long in the home because of their 'natural' focus on relationships, children,
and an ethic of care."'" Only by changing society's views could women
hope for change:
One can argue, therefore, that until changes occurred regarding married
women's property, a woman's claim to custody of her children would al-
most always lose precisely because the best interests of the child directed
that it stay with the parent who had legal control over property-that is, the
father.... Although the 'separate spheres' ideology and the cult of domes-
ticity gave women a voice and a claim for recognition of their reproductive
labor, it also provided a new way of thinking about the family that bol-
stered patriarchal control.'05
Because women had no rights to property and were effectively banned
from the economic sphere, women could not possibly support their children.
Consequently, fathers were automatically awarded custody."
While the separate spheres ideology had some adverse affects on
98. See ROBERTL. GRISWOLD, FATHERHOOD IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 10-12 (1993), cited
in Joan Williams, Toward a Reconstructive Feminism: Reconstructing the Relationship of
Market Work and Family Work, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 89, 110 (1998); Swank, supra note 97,
at 915.
99. See Jennison, supra note 22, at1 142; Carpenter, supra note 20, at 36.
100. See Jennison, supra note 22, at 1144-45. See also Carpenter, supra note 20, at 37
(arguing that a Rhode Island court's decision in United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30
(C.C.R.I. 1824), marks a shift from a conclusive to a rebuttable paternal presumption, thereby
diluting the presumption and laying the foundation for later changes).
101. See McNeely, supra note 22, at 896-900.
102. See id. at 897-98.
103. In accordance with this ideology, women were considered "physically and tempera-
mentally weaker, were deemed incapable of adapting to the rigorous demands of the work-
place and were singularly charged with the management of the domestic sphere... The
stereotypical images of fathers as familial bread-winners and mothers as domestic caretakers
and primary child-rearers were born." See McNeely, supra note 22, at 892-93.
104. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 1.
105. Danaya C. Wright, De Manneville v. De Manneville: Rethinking The Birth of Cus-
tody Law Under Patriarchy, 17 LAW & HIST. REv. 247, 303-04 (1999).
106. See Jennison, supra note 22, atl 143-44; Swank, supra note 96, at 915-917.
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women, a new focus on the nurturing nature of mothers ultimately resulted
in the "tender years doctrine."'"° This doctrine automatically granted custody
of young children-usually age seven or under-to the mother unless she
was deemed unfit.' °8 The strength of the tender years presumption was re-
flected in an 1830 Maryland decision, where the court stated:
[E]ven a court of common law will not go so far as to hold nature in con-
tempt, and snatch helpless, puling infancy from the bosom of an affection-
ate mother, and place it in the coarse hands of the father. The mother is the
softest and safest nurse of infancy, and with her it will be left in opposition
to this general right of the father."
Faced with such gender-based presumptions due to visitation awards
limiting their contact following divorce, many fathers lost touch with their
children."' In spite of its deleterious consequences for the father-child post-
divorce relationship, nearly all states adopted this presumption-the tender
years doctrine-in one form or another, making it the accepted norm in cus-
tody determinations for a century."' As demand for gender neutral laws con-
tinued to mount however, and women entered the workforce in increasing
numbers,"' most states eliminated the tender years doctrine by the end of the
1970s."' A new era in custody law was about to begin.
B. Modem Custody Laws
No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of
family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas."'
By the mid-twentieth century, the tender years doctrine fell into disfa-
107. The tender years doctrine originated in England in 1839 when Parliament enacted
Justice Talfourd's Act, 2 and 3 Vict. c. 54, which legalized the presumption that women
should receive custody of children under age seven. See RICHARD A. WARSHAK, THE CUSTODY
REVOLUTION: THE FATHER FACTOR AND THE MOTHERHOOD MYSTIQUE 29 (1992); McNeely,
supra note 22, at 897-98.
108. See Jennison, supra note 22, at 1145 (noting that while the paternal presumption
may have been strong, "the maternal bias under the tender years presumption was overwhelm-
ing."); Carpenter, supra note 20, at 38.
109. Devine v. Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 689 (1981) (quoting Helms v. Franciscus, 2
Bland Ch. 544 (Md. 1830)).
110. See Theresa A. Peterson, The State of Child Custody in Minnesota: Why Minnesota
Should Enact the Parenting Plan Legislation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1577, 1591-1592
(1999) (arguing that visitation arrangements require contact between two antagonistic parents,
and the resulting "friction and difficulty of the encounters may cause fathers to give up trying
... [and] become apathetic, and feel that the system is biased against them.").
111. See Jacobs, supra note 26, at 853.
112. See id.
113. See id.; see also Jennison, supra note 22, at 1145.
114. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975).
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vor with both feminists and fathers' rights groups."' Standards favoring ei-
ther gender seemed out of touch with reality as more women went to work
and an increasing number of fathers became involved in childrearing."6
Around the same time, increased public acceptance of divorce led states to
adopt no-fault divorce laws."7 Every American jurisdiction now provides for
some form of no-fault divorce, whereby divorce may be granted when a
couple can show that "the marriage is irretrievably broken, that the parties
have irreconcilable differences, that the parties are incompatible, or that
they have lived apart for a stated period of time.""' Traditional grounds for
divorce under the fault-based system include adultery, abandonment, deser-
tion and physical or mental cruelty."9 This shift from fault-based to no-fault
divorce also changed the rules for custody, property distribution, and ali-
mony.'
Florida was not immune from these changes. As a result of no-fault di-
vorce, Florida adopted the equitable distribution theory of property distribu-
tion on divorce, which entitles each spouse to an equal share of marital
property.' In spite of claims that equitable distribution acted to promote
equal property division in divorce, the Florida Study concluded that equita-
ble distribution has been "anything but equitable."'2 The no-fault revolution
also changed the rules for alimony by assuming that women can support
themselves financially after divorce." As a consequence, Florida witnessed
"the virtual abandonment of permanent alimony" in favor of temporary or
rehabilitative alimony.'24 Pointing to evidence that women earn less than
men for similar work, the Florida Study suggests that "alimony should be
considered as general compensation for the wife's lost opportunities rather
than a claim for support based upon need."'"
115. See Carpenter, supra note 20, at 39.
116. See id.
117. See Sanford N. Katz, Prologue, 33 FAM. L.Q. 435, 437 (1999) ("In 1969, California
became the first state to enact a divorce law without fault-based grounds.").
118. Marygold S. Melli, Whatever Happened to Divorce?, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 637, 637
n. 1 (2000) (citing Linda D. Elrod et al., A Review of the Year in Family Law: Children's Is-
sues Dominate, 32 FAM. L.Q. 661, 715 tbl.4 (1998)).
119. See Jane Biondi, Who Pays for Guilt?: Recent Fault-Based Divorce Reform Propos-
als, Cultural Stereotypes and Economic Consequences, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 611, 613-14 (1999)
(arguing that current no-fault divorce laws allow a couple to assess the viability of the mar-
riage and judges typically will not interfere with the couple's decision).
120. See FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 43, at 54-62.
121. See id. at 56.
122. Id. at 59 (showing that Florida courts consistently award between sixty-five and sev-
enty-five percent of the property to men, while women tend to receive only twenty-five to
thirty-five percent of the property). One attorney in Florida tells female clients, even those
who have contributed significantly to their marriage over many years, "that it will be a mira-
cle... if she ends up with 50 percent of the assets." Id. at 61.
123. See id. at 56.
124. Id. at 56 (citing Florida State University Policy Studies Clinic, Gender Bias and
Family Law: A Study of Judicial Decisions in Florida (Aug. 1988) (unpublished)).
125. Id. at 58. See also WiLLiAMs, supra note 3, at 101-104 (discussing the Equal Pay
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Much of the evidence collected in the Florida Study suggests that Flor-
ida courts strongly favor husbands when distributing marital property and
awarding alimony,'26 but the divorce revolution also had a negative impact
on divorcing fathers:
The increase in divorce promoted the marginalization of fathers far more
extensively than the Industrial Revolution because divorce literally severed
the father from the home on a permanent basis. Many fathers resigned
themselves to continuing their role primarily as financial providers for
their children and their now ex-wives, and adjusted to seeing their children
approximately four days each month.
... Some realized that society, particularly divorce courts, nonetheless
compelled them to remain in the outdated role as aloof financial caretak-
ers, and they began to question and confront this gender bias. 27
In an attempt to achieve gender neutrality, state legislatures enacted
child custody legislation that specifically forbids gender preferences.' State
custody laws now focus on children's interests rather than their parents'
gender, as most states now apply some variation of the "best interests of the
child" standard.'29
1. The Best Interests of the Child Standard
While the best interests standard is ostensibly gender neutral, there can be
little debate that in practice, the courts favor mothers.., the maternal
presumption 'has disappeared.., in terms of the law on the books,' but as
a social norm 'it still persists. When two competent parents-a fit mother
and a fit father-each want to be primarily responsible for the child fol-
lowing divorce, mothers usually end up with the children."'
Act). But see Sanford L. Braver, The Gender Gap in Standard of Living After Divorce: Van-
ishingly Small?, 33 FAM. L.Q. 11 (1999).
126. See Florida STUDY, supra note 43, at 55 (concluding that as no-fault divorce disad-
vantages women and children, and is "highly advantageous for most men," theoretically, un-
der the fault system women could use divorce as a bargaining chip by withholding divorce un-
til their husbands agreed to more advantageous settlements).
127. McNeely, supra note 22, at 905-06 (emphasis added).
128. See Jennison, supra note 22, at 1146; Swank, supra note 97, at 920-21 (noting that a
majority of state courts have held that custody laws which distinguish solely on the basis of
gender violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States). For example, a Florida statute provides: "After considering all relevant
facts, the father of the child shall be given the same consideration as the mother in determin-
ing the primary residence of a child irrespective of the age or the sex of the child." FLA. STAT.
oh. 61.13(2)(b)(1) (1999).
129. See Law & Hennessey, supra note 26, at 348.
130. SANFoRD BRAvER wmT DIANE O'CoNNEL, DIVORcED DADS: SHATTERING THE
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As its name suggests, the best interests of the child standard (hereinaf-
ter "best interests standard") focuses on children. The standard first emerged
in the nineteenth century when courts were operating under the tender years
presumption that young children belonged with their mother.'' In practice,
therefore, the gender-biased tender years doctrine reflected the best interests
of the child because it presumed that young children should only be sepa-
rated from their mothers in exceptional circumstances.' As mothers' roles
changed in the second half of the twentieth century, however, it could no
longer be assumed that it was in the best interests of children to be with
their mothers." Accordingly, Congress followed the lead of many states by
enacting the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act of 1970, which was in-
tended to codify existing state laws.' The Act provided several factors for
determining the best interests of the child.'35 Today, states that rely on the
best interests standard usually provide similar guiding factors for courts to
use in making their custody determinations. 3
The statutory factors provided are often inadequate, however, and may
even increase the costs. and incidence of litigation.'37 Since judges have wide
discretion, parents may have an incentive to pursue litigation and try to con-
vince the judge that they deserve custody.' Moreover, judges must deter-
MYTHs 219 (1998) (quoting ELLEN MACCOBY & ROBERT MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHID 283
(1992)).
131. See Jennison, supra note 22, at 1144-45; Carpenter, supra note 20, at 39-40 (citing
an 1895 Minnesota case as the first to declare that a child's interests and welfare are para-
mount).
132. See Jennison, supra note 22, at 1145-46.
133. See McNeely, supra note 22, at 904-06.
134. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, Comment, 9A U.L.A. (1998). This
comment also supports the panel's decision: "the existing custodian is usually preferred to any
new custodian because of the interest in assuring continuity for the child." See id.
135. See id:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the child.
The court shall consider all relevant factors including: (1) the wishes of the child's
parent or parents as to his custody; (2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and (5) the mental
and physical health of all individuals involved. The court shall not consider con-
duct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship to the child.
136. See Carpenter, supra note 20, at 39-40.
137. See Swank, supra note 97, at 923 (noting that "[t]his approach has been widely criti-
cized as too vague and failing to provide sufficient guidance to courts and to the parties seek-
ing custody, thus increasing the cost and incidence of litigation."). As Swank notes, criticisms
of the best interests standard include: (1) the standard often requires the court to determine
who is the "better" parent, which thereby vests the court with too much discretion and results
in judicial bias; (2) the court must also rely on the testimony of experts (psychologists, psy-
chiatrists, social workers and sociologists), which is often expensive and time consuming; and
(3) judicial discretion allows family court judges to base their decisions on anachronistic, gen-
der-based assumptions about a woman's place in society and in the family. See id. at 924 n.85.
138. See id. at 923-24.
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mine the best interests of a child of whom they know very little after
reviewing only a small amount of information about the family, and this in-
formation itself is often presented in a biased way to favor one parent or an-
other.'3' As a result of the wide discretion accorded judges in this area,
coupled with their minimal familiarity with the families before them, judges
wi-l naturally rely on their own personal biases and beliefs, including any
gender bias they may consciously or subconsciously hold, rather than on
any carefully defined standards.' On the national level, this judicial reli-
ance on internal personal factors is best reflected by the fact that even when
both parents agree that the father should have custody, courts still grant cus-
tody to mothers in thirteen percent of the cases.'
Florida appellate courts provide an example of how reluctant courts are
to reverse a custody determination, regardless of which parent receives cus-
tody. " On appeal, a Florida parent must show that the trial judge abused his
discretion in awarding custody to the other parent.43 When custody is ini-
tially awarded to mothers, it is difficult to prove abuse of discretion in Flor-
ida because "[m]ost judges do not state that they are awarding custody to
the mother because she is the mother; instead, they may base their decision
on a finding that the mother is the more fit parent due to her role as the pri-
mary caretaker and that it is in the child's best interests to remain with
her."'" Exacerbating this problem is the fact that Florida does not require
family court judges to make specific findings of fact for the record when de-
termining custody.'45 In fact, judges need not articulate any reasons for their
decisions, which "makes it highly difficult to prove exactly what motivated
the judge's decision, and thus opens the door for the court to interject gen-
der biases favoring mother-custody when making a custody determina-
139. See Jacobs, supra note 26, at 854-55.
140. See Carpenter, supra note 20, at 40-41, 56-59 (arguing for the elimination of any
factors which permit judges to rely on open-ended discretion).
141. See Bonnie Miller Rubin, Will County Judge's Decision Highlights New Tack on
Divorce and Dads, Ci. TRIB., Aug.15, 1995, at Metro 1.
142. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203. Under Florida law, a judge
abuses his discretion when:
[T]he judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable... If reasonable men
could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot
be said that the trial court abused its discretion.
The discretionary power that is exercised by a trial judge is not, however, without
limitation.... The trial court's discretionary power is subject only to the test of
reasonableness, but that test requires a determination of whether there is logic and
justification for the result.
Id.
143. See id. at 1203.
144. McNeely, supra note 22, at 942.
145. See id.
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tion."' As a result, good fathers are often denied custody or liberal visita-
tion without explanation, thereby adversely affecting the best interests of the
children. 7
Although there are obvious problems with the implementation of this
approach, the best interests standard does one thing right: it emphasizes the
needs and desires of children rather than focusing on their parents. Perhaps
by fine-tuning the system so that implementation carries out this concept
rather than perpetuating gender bias, this standard can work.
At the same time, courts "should make and enforce more equitable
property and support agreements."'"" For example, in Young v. Hector the
trial court could have awarded custody to Young and then provided him
with adequate child support and a more equitable division of property. If the
trial court had done so, "economic stability" would not have been a consid-
eration weighing against him. By not awarding custody to Young, the trial
court abused its discretion and the panel properly reversed the decision.
2. Primary Caretaker Presumption
While fathers are involved in child care, more now than in any period in
recent history, they generally have not become the primary caretaker par-
ent even today. The father generally is not the one who changes the dia-
pers, dresses and bathes the child, takes the child to school, cares for the
child's health, or interacts with others involved in the education of and
caring for the child.149
Robert Young argued that he represented the exception. In his view,
"[y]ou don't have to be a female to be a parent. Dads can be moms, too. ' "
While Hector may have performed tasks traditionally associated with moth-
ering, Young's involvement in other activities involved emotional interac-
tion with his children and was no less important than Hector's contribu-
tions.
5 1
The primary caretaker presumption assumes that the best interest of the
146. Id.
147. Robert Young voiced the frustration of many fathers when he said: "Throughout this
entire process I have encountered gender bias and discrimination. I always thought this would
be about the best interest of the children." McMahon, supra note 32.
148. Jacobs, supra note 26, at 882.
149. FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 43, at 65.
150. Jim Oliphant, A Woman's Work: Hard-driving Lawyer Loses Custody of Children to
Unemployed Ex-Husband; Woman Loses Custody of Daughters to Ex-Husband; Judges Cite
Demands of Her Successful Career, MIAMI DAILY Bus. REy., July 1, 1998, at Al. Young's
own comment evidences the deep-seeded gender biases by assuming that dads have to be like
moms to be good parents rather than simply taking on a distinct father's role.
151. In fact, "[m]any men, whose wives work, do share in taking kids to school and back,
do help with the grocery shopping, and do perform some of the household chores. The fact is,
men have always had to combine work outside the home with fathering. Yet the fathering as-
pects have rarely been honored." BRAVER & O'CoNNEL, supra note 130, at 237 (quoting
MARK BRYAN, THE PRODIGAL FATHER: REUNITING FATHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN 4 (1997)).
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child lies with the parent who has taken on primary responsibility for man-
aging the child's day-to-day activities, including cooking meals, bathing the
child, monitoring the child's health needs, taking the child to school, arrang-
ing social activities, and disciplining the child." Critics argue that the pre-
sumption favors women because it focuses on activities typically associated
with women.' Others argue, however, that the presumption is in the best
interests of children because it places children with the parent who has taken
on the most parental responsibility.
The primary caretaker presumption has been well received by scholars,
but has been less successful in practice. 5 According to one commentator,
the primary caretaker preference is fraught with problems:
First, the quantity of childcare may not correspond with either the quality
of childcare or the quality of the parent-child relationship. Second, the pre-
sumption is unworkable in families where parents share or allocate parent-
ing tasks or change parenting roles, either during marriage or after separat-
ing. Finally, it has generated huge quantities of litigation revolving around
such petty issues as who changes the diapers, who does the supper dishes,
or who makes the peanut butter sandwiches. The preference succeeds only
in the easy case-where one parent is a full-time homemaker caring for
small children.'5
After the panel decision in Young, the Florida legislature noted the
panel's emphasis on the American Law Institute's (ALI) primary caretaker
doctrine, but added "[i]t remains to be seen whether other district courts will
follow the Third District and adopt the ALI's heavy emphasis on primary-
152. See Sanford N. Katz, 'That They May Thrive' Goal of Child Custody: Reflections on
the Apparent Erosion of the Tender Years Presumption and the Emergence of the Primary
Caretaker Presumption, 8 1. CONTEmP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 123, 133 (1992), cited by Swank,
supra note 97, at 925 n.89; Carpenter, supra note 20, at 51-52; Jacobs, supra note 26, at 895-
96. The presumption differs from the primary caretaker factor under the best interests standard
in that under the presumption, being the primary caretaker is the sole determinant of custody;
whereas, under the best interest of the child standard, the primary caretaker is only one of
many factors considered. See Jacobs, supra note 26, at 895-96 (arguing that the primary care-
taker factor should be a very important consideration, but the primary caretaker presumption is
probably not a better standard than the best interests of the child standard). I will use the term
"presumption," however, to refer to the concept in general. Only West Virginia and Minnesota
have adopted the primary caretaker presumption, and Minnesota later reduced the presumption
to a mere factor. See Law & Hennessey, supra note 26, at 355.; Kandel, supra note 51, at 343
n.195. See also W. VA. CODE § 44 -10 - 4 (1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(3) (1994).
153. See Swank, supra note 97, at 925-26: see also Letter from David R. Usher, Secre-
tary, National Congress for Fathers and Children, to Missouri Supreme Court 5 (Sept. 21,
1997).
154. See Carpenter, supra note 20, at 61 (arguing that fathers who are truly the primary
caretaker will not be disadvantaged and the standard will encourage fathers to take a more ac-
tive role in their child's life); Paradise, supra note 94, at 535 (arguing that the system is a re-
turn to the tender years presumption).
155. See Kandel, supra note 51, at 342-43.
156. Id. at 343.
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caretaker status in deciding primary residential custody."'" As the panel cor-
rectly concluded, the primary caretaker presumption should be extended to
activities beyond those traditionally associated with mothers (e.g. feeding,
clothing and bathing the children).' Narrowly speaking, such application
clearly favors Robert Young, but it also may eliminate gender bias against
fathers generally.
3. Shared Parental Responsibility
There's a word for couples who coordinate child rearing, housekeeping,
and financial duties equally-'married. , 59
As previously discussed, Florida has adopted a shared parental respon-
sibility presumption."w Since the trial court in Young made no specific find-
ing that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the children,
it can only be assumed that the Young court intended to award shared paren-
tal responsibility.' Under this standard, the custodial and non-custodial
parents are supposed to have equal say: "[e]ach party has input for example
on issues relating to education, health, religion, discipline, etc. and as al-
ways, if the parties can't agree, the Judge will decide for them."'' The Flor-
ida Study made it clear however that Florida courts were not properly adher-
ing to the shared responsibility doctrine. According to the Florida Study,
"the judiciary is improperly converting this presumption into a mandate by
ordering shared parental responsibility without due consideration of factors
specified in the statute, including parental desires and the best interests of
157. The panel relied heavily on the PRINCILES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DiSSOLUTON:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, AMERICAN LAW INsTrruTE, Part I, § 2.09 (Tentative Draft
No. 3, 1998). FLORIDA FAMILY LAW § 32.21 states: "According to the ALI's tentative guide-
lines, perpetuation of existing caretaker roles should be the primary factor set forth in deter-
mining custody. The advantage of such an emphasis on parental roles is that it facilitates ob-jective decisions concerning which parents should become primary residential custodians."
See Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, Tentative
Draft No. 3, Part 1, A.L.I. §§ 2.09, 108, 113, 120-21 (1998). Although the bench subsequently
withdrew the panel's decision, it is unclear whether the ALI's standards will still be the domi-
nant test in that district.
158. See Paul L. Smith, The Primary Caretaker Presumption: Have We Been Presuming
Too Much?, 75 IND. L.J. 731, 747 (2000) ("My basic argument is that if we are going to use a
list of [primary caretaker] factors as a proxy for which parent has the closest bond with a
child, we should at least be sure that those factors actually represent that bond.").
159. Janet Normalvanbreucher, Stalking Through the Courts: The 'Father's Rights'
Movement - How to Legally Stalk, Harass, and Intimidate Victims of Domestic Violence after
a Restraining Order has been Issued, 29 (visited February 15, 2000)
<http://www.gate.net/-liz/liz/FRtactic.html>.
160. See Section IIA, supra.
161. See, e.g., Schoonmaker v. Schoonmaker, 718 So. 2d 867, 868 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998) (per curiasn).
162. Arnie Gruskin, "Florida Divorce and Children" (visited February 23, 2000)
<http:llwww.divorcesource.comFIARTICLES/gruskin2.html>.
206 [Vol. 37
22
California Western Law Review, Vol. 37 [2000], No. 1, Art. 12
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol37/iss1/12
GENDER BIAS IN A FLORIDA COURT
the child."'' Although Florida has attempted to eliminate historical stereo-
types and gender biases from child custody determinations, family court
judges continue to make decisions based on their individual biases and ap-
pellate courts must adhere to narrow standards of review, thus limiting their
ability to hold family court judges accountable.
Perhaps it is time to place the decision in the hands of those most af-
fected by custody determinations: the children. Professor Randy Frances
Kandel of Loyola Law School in Los Angeles has proposed a "rule of chil-
dren's choice" where "as between fit parental custodians who cannot agree
on the child's custody, the choice of children six years old and older should
be legally dispositive as to their custody."'" According to Kandel, the law
currently views children as psychologically "delicate, incompetent, and at
risk."'" Such a legal vision, Kandel argues, "unjustifiably denigrates the
personhood of the child, depriving children of their fundamental liberty and
decision-making autonomy."'" A rule of children's choice, Kandel asserts,
would result in fair settlements for all concerned and would clearly be in the
best interests of the child.67 The Florida legislature recognized the inherent
fairness of the rule of children's choice by providing for "the reasonable
preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient intel-
ligence, understanding, and experience to express a preference."'66 If parents
or judges are unwilling to ask children to make such a difficult decision,
however, and the courts are unable to fashion a solution to custody prob-
lems, it may be time to seek non-legal solutions to the dilemmas facing
families going through divorce.'"
IV. CUSTODY BATTLES: THE REAL VICTIMS ARE THE CHILDREN
Our children have too greatly suffered the consequences of a mythology
that says most divorced men are irresponsible, deadbeat, runaway fa-
thers.... If we relinquish our societal need to assign blame and identify a
villain, if we can only recognize that real human beings are at stake here,
that both mothers and fathers are trying their best under difficult circum-
stances, then we can be in a position to rescue our families from what Bar-
bara Dafoe Whitehead in her recent book calls The Divorce Culture. The
163. FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 43, at 7.
164. Kandel, supra note 51, at 375. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act also lists
"the wishes of the child as to his custodian" as a factor. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT
§ 402(2), 9A U.L.A. (1998).
165. Kandel, supra note 51, at 376.
166. Id.
167. See id.
168. FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13(3)(i) (1999).
169. See Jacobs, supra note 26, at 898-99 (arguing that mediation and legal education are
two such avenues that might be utilized as an alternative to the typical route of the courtroom);
see also BRAVER & O'CONNEL, supra note 130, at 231-32 (1998) (discussing an example of
one such program in California).
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pendulum has inarguably swung too far. It is time to swing it back.17
One way to achieve this desired pendulum swing is for mothers and fa-
thers to spend more time protecting the children's interests and less time
creating ways to outsmart the opposite sex. Thus far, this Comment has pro-
vided evidence of gender bias in the Young decision and in various state
statutory schemes. This section shows how battles between gender-based
groups have manipulated gender biases to serve their own aims while exac-
erbating the custody problem by taking the focus away from the children
and placing it on the parents. Both sides feel as though they are getting the
short end of the stick. Consequently, child custody becomes a competition.
In the meantime, children are the ones who are truly harmed by failed solu-
tions.
A. Fathers' Rights Groups: Legitimate and Illegitimate Groups
Number of Families with Children Under 18 in 1997: 3Z6 Million
Both parents: 25.6 million
Mother only: 10 million
Father only: 2 million''
Although many more mothers are single parents than fathers, single fa-
thers' issues are no less significant than single mothers' issues. Partly in re-
sponse to the perceived disrespect accorded them, fathers' rights groups
have flourished.' " Illegitimate fathers' rights groups are often characterized
by calls for changes in laws pertaining to restraining orders, child support,
and advice for fathers seeking to defeat women in custody determinations.'
According to one commentator, however, the key distinction between le-
gitimate and illegitimate fathers' groups is simply the term "right."'74 Often
times, fathers are led to believe that the system, not their lawyers or their
own actions, has wronged them in some way.' As a consequence, passions
rise and "[i]t only takes one or two legitimate cases of unfair treatment to
convince an uneducated public unfamiliar with the inner workings of the ju-
170. BRAVER & O'CoNNEL, supra note 130, at 247.
171. Petersen, supra note 11 (citing the U.S. Census Bureau to show rate of growth of
single fathers and single mothers since 1980). See also McNeely, supra note 22, at 933 n.230
(citing Steve W. Rawlings, U.S. DEPr. OF COM. HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS,
March 1993 XV: SVII 5-7 (1994), showing that in 1993, 87% of children living with one par-
ent lived with their mothers and 13% lived with their fathers).
172. A simple search on the Internet produced forty web sites devoted to fathers' rights
groups.
173. See David R. Throop, Men CAN and DO Win Custody (visited March 12, 2000)
<http:llwww.vix.comlpub/men/custody-divorcelresource/cando.html>.
174. See Normalvanbreucher, supra note 159, at 5 (stating that, in other words, any group
identifying itself as a father's rights group is not a part of the "legitimate men's movement.").
175. See id. at 24.
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dicial process that all fathers are being discriminated against.' ' 76
While fathers have many legitimate concerns regarding gender bias in
custody determinations, these concerns are often trivialized by the rhetoric
of illegitimate groups. The following document, entitled "The Father's
Manifesto," was signed by dozens of leaders of fathers' rights groups, and is
a prime example of the illegitimate material available to fathers:
We Signatories to the Fathers' Manifesto, responding to natural and Bibli-
cal laws, in defense of our nation and our families, hereby declare and as-
sert our patriarchal role in society. America is an experiment in freedom,
and the feminist experiment in freedom, under the guise of "equality,"
unleashed a panapoly [sic] of social ills which have become a cancer on
our land, led to the moral and economic destruction of our nation, made
America a house divided unto itself, created a vast underclass with a bleak
and bankrupt future, and is the greatest national disaster we have ever
faced.
Recognizing patriarchy to be the greatest creator of wealth, prosperity, and
stability civilization has ever known, we hereby demand that our children,
homes, lives, liberty; and property be unconditionally restored to us. We
hereby demand replacement of the doctrine of Parens Patria with the Bib-
lical doctrines upon which this nation was founded.
We hereby recognize and reaffirm that patriarchy is the order established
under God and His Natural Law.
We, the posterity of this nation, hereby reclaim our ancestral liberties and
God-given rights.'77
Similar pro-male documents can be found on numerous fathers' rights
web sites.17S The hyperbole of such language found on some of these web
sites destroys the credibility of all fathers' rights groups and lessens the im-
pact of valid statistical information that also can be found on these web
sites. Statistics on one fathers' rights web site, for example, indicate that
eighty-five percent of divorcing men lose custody battles.'79 While the per-
centage is probably closer to ninety percent,'"° these statistics indicate that
176. Id. at 29.
177. Id. at 16 (quoting the Reaffirmation of the Father's Manifesto (1997)).
178. One can easily find any number of pro-father documents by doing a search on the
Internet using the words "fathers' rights."
179. See The Fatherhood Coalition (visited March 17, 2000) <http://www.fatherhood
coalition.org>.
180. See Swank, supra note 96, at 928. Compare NAT'L CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAM. L.
CHILD CUSTODY PROJECr, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Joint Custody: An Attack on
Women and Children 2 (undated), cited by FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 43, at 66 (arguing that
"[flathers are not discriminated against in custody or family law cases. The fact that 90 per-
cent of children live with their mothers is not a result of judicial bias, but of paternal prefer-
ence. This 90 percent figure includes those cases where fathers have abandoned their families,
do not contest custody, or agree to custody in the mother."), with Paradise, supra note 93, at
579 n.239, arguing that:
[T]he cultural presumption that sole maternal custody is the best solution to cus-
tody disputes has led to nearly ninety percent of all custody battles ending with the
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fathers have legitimate concerns that are often masked by the agendas of
more radical groups.
Fathers with legitimate concerns often have nowhere to turn. John, a
Massachusetts father who recently lost custody of his two sons, 8' was told
that the system would focus on the children and that GALs work for the
children.'" John became disenchanted, however, when the GAL in his case
paid very little attention to the children, never allowed the children to speak
directly to him alone, and interviews with the GAL "turned into a he
said/she said."'8 The children "wound up feeling left out of the process after
I had tried to tell them that the GAL worked ONLY FOR THEM [sic] no
one else!" ' 4 John seemed disgusted by the whole process: "My feelings at
this point are that the GAL was attempting to prove the boys were best left
with their mother but was unable to find any reason why they shouldn't
come to live with me so his decision was to lean to the side of least resis-
tance."'" Although the children were left out of the process, the judge fol-
lowed the GAL's recommendation and told John he would not change his
mind, and that it would be a waste of time going to trial because he "does
not take children away from their mothers in Massachusetts."'
18 6
John's experience with the GAL reveals how embedded the problem of
gender bias has become in family courts. Professional custody evaluators
may wish to take the path of least resistance if they know a particular judge
is biased one way or the other. In John's case, the children should have been
the focus, but apparently were not. Consequently, fathers like John are often
"recruited" by illegitimate fathers' rights groups, but these groups take ad-
vantage of emotional fathers and ultimately hurt their cause more than they
help it. Perhaps the harmful effects of these groups can be overcome as le-
gitimate fathers' rights groups forge alliances with feminists, but the road to
cooperation appears to be a long one."
mother retaining sole physical custody of her children. Society frowns upon
women who relinquish custody of their children, due to the presumption that their
rightful place is with their children. A joint custody presumption might change
what society views as the norm in child custody, and could give fathers a better
chance of maintaining contact with their children after divorce.
(citations omitted).
181. John is not his real name. The boys were ages 10 and 12 at the time. See e-mail from
John to Craig Nickerson (March 14, 2000) (on file with author).
182. See id
183. The GAL in John's case recommended that the mother receive custody. See id.
184. Id. (emphasis in original).
185. Id. John was not given a copy of the report, and attempts to get a copy of the GAL
report proved fruitless. See id. He could only see it by going to the court and asking to review
it, and was told that GAL reports are "supposed to be one of the most confidential documents
in the court ... No one is allowed to copy it and it can NEVER be used against you in a court
of law, outside the custody trial." Id.
186. Id.
187. See Swent, supra note 21, at 85-86 ("Judicial education can continue and state legal
systems can contemplate even significant reforms-as long as no one tells the (mostly) men at
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B. Bias Against Women: The Feminist Perspective
[Flathers can, in the right circumstances, be turned into mothers, [but] the
social reality is that moms are already moms... . It is surely in the best in-
terests of children to recognize this social reality and guarantee the conti-
nuity of care which will be most protective of young children.
Although some feminists are willing to recognize that some fathers
have legitimate concerns, many believe "the lingering effects of the tender
years doctrine is largely due to the fact that, in most situations, the man
truly is less involved with his children."' 9 In addition, mothers may be less
sympathetic to men's issues because they are also victims of gender bias in
custody determinations; a common scenario involves women pursuing pro-
fessional careers.'" The bias, however, is often more far-reaching:
If [women] do not work, courts question their ability to support their chil-
dren; yet, if they do, courts question their commitment as mothers. On the
other hand, working fathers are viewed as normal and are not placed under
the same scrutiny. The same bias is illustrated regarding the use of child
care. Women who must rely on day care are often criticized for not being
available to their children, while fathers are often praised for being able to
support and provide for their children at the same time.1
91
After the panel's decision in Young, many feminists argued that Alice
Hector was the victim of gender bias."g Joan Williams, for example, argued
that Hector continued to assume many of the parental responsibilities de-
the top that the topic is gender bias, the leaders are women and the approach is feminist.").
188. Phyllis T. Bookspan, From a Tender Years Presumption to a Primary Parent Pre-
sumption: Has Anything Really Changed?... Should It?, 8 B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 75, 85 (1993)
(quoting Mary Ann Mason, Motherhood v. Equal Treatment, 29 J. FAM. L. 1, 25 (1990)).
189. Normalvanbreucher, supra note 159, at 28. Normalvanbreucher admits, however,
that "blanket assumptions that men, by virtue of being male, are less involved with their chil-
dren than the mother still persist in some courts." Id.
190. See, e.g., Greene v. French, 641 P.2d 524 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a
woman's employment outside the home is only one factor considered in a custody determina-
tion and generally is not enough by itself to cause her to be denied custody); In re Marriage of
Riddle, 500 N.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (affirming a grant of custody to the
father because the mother had devoted a great deal of time to education and work and rejecting
the mother's argument that she was being punished for adopting a traditional male role). See
also Normalvanbreucher, supra note 159, at 4 (arguing that "[a]s women began to work out-
side the home, men responded to their newfound role as nurturer with ambiguity ... Femi-
nism, with all of its trappings, seriously undermined a man's ability to dominate his family
and control his spouse as women demanded equal opportunities in education, the workforce,
and in the home.").
191. Carpenter, supra note 20, at 41-42.
192. One commentator called the panel's decision "a disservice to women" because it
"compels women to choose between success as a stay-at-home mom and success in achieving
a high level of professional status, but tells women that they may never choose both." Barbara
George Johnson, Case Summary, Young v. Hector. Stay-at-Home Dad vs. Professional Mom,
20 Wo EN's RTs. L. REP. 195, 197 (1999).
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spite her hectic work schedule."3 The press, Williams therefore contends,
inappropriately characterized the panel's decision as a custody award to a
stay-at-home dad because the facts of the case clearly distinguished it from
cases where the mother stays at home. 4 As a contrast to such cases, Wil-
liams notes that Young only volunteered in the children's after-school ac-
tivities after Hector filed for divorce. 9' In other words, he only became in-
volved in their lives when he feared he might lose custody. 6
Recent cases involving Marcia Clark' and Sharon Prost,"' two high-
profile working mothers, provide further examples of the bias against pro-
fessional moms and the passions that such cases bring about. A typical re-
sponse to these cases was the following:
[T]he trial court effectively concluded that Prost's masculine commitment
to her career was incompatible with her feminine role as a mother. The
case law makes clear that it is not the mother's working outside the home
per se that courts find problematic. Rather, evincing a masculine attitude
toward work - seeming to place career before family - marks women as
bad mothers.'
Gender bias is clearly a hot-button issue that sparks intense debate be-
tween feminists and fathers' rights groups. More often than not, this debate
masks the more important issues involved with the children's best interests.
In Florida, some father's rights groups blame the shared parental responsi-
bility standard for this gender-based friction because it "thrust[s] the par-
ticipants, including the children, into a legal tug-of-war, compounding the
very disputes the laws are intended to preclude.... The system of divorce
as currently practiced in this state is the furthest thing from amicable and
unnecessarily so."' As one member of the National Women's Law Center
stated: "[w]e don't need more polarization... more pro-male or pro-
female." '' Instead, what is needed is cooperation between the gender groups
193. See WIuLIAMs, supra note 3, at 140.
194. See id.
195. See id. (referring to Hector's contention that such was the case).
196. See id.
197. See Tamar Lewin, Demands of Simpson Case Land Prosecutor in Custody Fight,
N.Y. TnvES, Mar. 3, 1995, at B8. See also BRAVER & O'CONNEL, supra note 130, at 220(quoting Judith Regan, An Open Letter to Mr. Clark, NEWSWEEK, March 13, 1995, at 57-58).
198. See Prost v. Greene, 652 A.2d 621 (D.C. 1995).
199. Note, Patriarchy is Such a Drag: The Strategic Possibilities of a Postmodern Ac-
count of Gender, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1973, 1996 (1995). Despite such emotional arguments,
however, the appellate court rejected Prost's argument that the trial judge's decision was the
result of "gender stereotyping"; rather, the "paramount" factor, concluded the appellate court,
was Prost's uncooperative behavior toward her husband. See Prost, 652 A.2d at 623, 624-25,
627. For instance, Prost filled out a "Parent Information Form for an employment agency....
In the space for 'Father's Name' [Prost] wrote 'N/A'." Id. at 625 n.6.
200. Parents Without Rights: Analysis of Florida's Divorce Law (visited March 14,
2000) <http//hometown.aol.com/PWRFlorida/PWR_08.html>.
201. Rubin, supra note 141 (quoting Elisabeth Donahue of the National Women's Law
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in an effort to eliminate all forms of gender bias, whether it affects men or
women.
C. The Evidence: Gender Bias Studies
According to most of the state studies on the subject, gender bias exists
throughout law, but it is particularly prevalent in family courts." In many
cases, that bias injures fathers. 3 Testimony reported by the Florida Study,
taken from a Jacksonville Public Hearing, indicated that "courts still pre-
sume that mothers are the better residential parent: '[S]ociety views moth-
erhood with a certain sanctity that mothers know what is best for their chil-
dren, and that they will act in their children's best interests."' 2  The Study
concluded:
[T]he overwhelming weight of evidence and research gathered by the
Commission supports only one possible conclusion: Although some may
ignore its existence, gender bias permeates the Florida legal system to-
day.... [G]ender bias is practiced to a disturbing degree by members of
this state's legal profession, often in forms that have become highly institu-
tionalized. The refusal of some lawyers to acknowledge this fact is one of
the primary mechanisms by which gender bias is perpetuated.2 5
Florida was not the only state to find gender bids against fathers. The
Utah study found that men are often categorized as "less capable and less
appropriate caretakers than women.., many fathers do not seek custody
because their attorneys advise them that their chances for success are mini-
Center).
202. See Swent, supra note 21, at 55, 60 (noting, for example, that gender bias studies
uniformly found bias against women in child support even though they were automatically
considered superior parents in custody determinations, and that fathers who work are praised
as breadwinners while mothers who work are criticized for spending too much time away
from their children). See generally McNeely, supra note 22.
203. According to Swent, 'The majority of states found that courts unjustly presume men
to be inferior parents to women." See Swent, supra note 21, at 55, 60. Studies, however, re-
veal that gender bias also adversely affects mothers. For example, the Michigan task force
found mothers who appear to be primary caregivers often lost custody cases when fathers
show the slightest interest in obtaining custody, while mothers who actively pursue careers
were considered less fit as parents than similarly ambitious fathers. See Carpenter, supra note
20, at 58 (citing MICH. SUPREmE CT. TASK FORCE ON GENDER ISSUES IN THE Crs. 69 (1989)).
The Florida Study also concluded: "the most recent and reliable research indicates that women
experience a cognizable degree of bias in custody decisions." FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 43,
at 63. According to a Massachusetts study, "fathers who actively seek custody obtain either
primary or joint physical custody over 70% of the time." Gender Bias Study, supra note 92, at
825. However, the results of the Massachusetts study have been challenged: "[a]n analysis of
the methodology underlying this conclusion.., demonstrates fundamental flaws that seem to
confirm a results-oriented analysis." Mcneely, supra note 22, at 908-09.
204. FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 43, at 64.
205. Id. at 42. One Florida attorney, however, flatly concludes that "[tlhere is no pre-
sumption in favor of women in Florida with regard to custody." Gruskin, supra note 162.
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mal." According to the New York task force, "men are perceived as unin-
volved parents who must explain their reasons for seeking custody whereas
women are seen as natural parents whose desire for custody is not only ac-
ceptable but expected." '2 The Georgia study listed the following beliefs
held by some judges: "a mother is a better parent than a father"; "a father
cannot work outside the home and be a nurturing parent"; "because a
mother is presumed to be the better parent, fathers must prove the mother
'unfit' in order to gain custody"; "if a court grants custody to a father, it
brands the mother as unfit and unworthy.""2 °
Two recent Florida decisions show that progress in that state may be
slow. In DeCamp v. Hein," a Florida family court paid lip service to the
Florida Legislature's clear intent to abolish the tender years doctrine, but in
granting custody of a one-year-old to the mother, the court stated:
It is true that the doctrine can no longer be dispositive because the 1983
amendment to the statute added the 'irrespective of age' language; how-
ever, we do not believe the doctrine has been totally abolished. For exam-
ple, a six-month-old baby being nursed by her mother should obviously be
in her mother's custody, unless the judge found her unfit. In the case at
bar, there is no mention of whether the one-year-old was being nursed by
the mother. Nonetheless, our version of common sense suggests that, under
the facts of this particular case, the one-year-old female and her three-
year-old sister preferably should reside with the mother."0
The court's conclusion is remarkable in light of the Legislature's lan-
guage, which evinces a clear intent to abolish the tender years doctrine."'
More recently, in Ayyash v. Ayyash, 212 the court stated: "Even though this
doctrine was overturned by the legislature's gender neutral policy, there re-
mains a temptation for many judges to consider the right to custody as the
mother's to lose and unless her fitness is legitimately challenged, the fa-
ther's right of equal consideration is often ignored.""t 3 These cases clearly
indicate that gender bias against Florida fathers persists. The bench's refusal
to recognize this bias in Young v. Hector could be masked by the difficult
abuse of discretion standard. The fact that the bench was willing to overrule
the trial court in all aspects other than custody, despite similarly stringent
206. Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender Bias in Family Courts, FAM. ADVoc. 26 (1994).
207. McNeely, supra note 22, at 943.
208. Id. (citing COMM'N ON GENDERBIAS iN JuD. SYs., GENDER & JUsTICE iNTHE CTs.: A
REP. TO THE SUPREME CT. OF GEO. BY THE COMM'N ON GENDER BIAS IN THE JUD. SYS. (1991),
reprinted in 8 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 539, 657 (1992)).
209. 541 So. 2d 708 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), rev. denied by Hein v. DeCamp, 551 So.
2d 461, overruled by Kuutti v. Kuutti, 645 So. 2d 80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
210. DeCamp, 541 So.2d at 710.
211. See FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13(2)(b)(1) (1999) (stating, "[t]he father shall be given the
same consideration as the mother in determining the primary residence of the child irrespec-
tive of the age of the child.").
212. 700 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
213. Id. at 755 n.3.
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standards of review, permits no other conclusion.
V. CONCLUSION: LOOKING AHEAD
A court's custody determination is one of the most critical decisions that
will ever impact the life of a child. It is crucial to that child's welfare and
future that the judge makes the best possible decision-a decision not in-
fluenced by gender bias-a decision that truly is in the best interest of the
child
214
Gender bias injures mothers, fathers and children. Common sense,
therefore, tells us that everyone will benefit from eradication of gender bias
and its insidious effects on child custody decisions. Gender bias has infected
custody determinations for over one hundred and fifty years, 5 and despite
numerous attempts to bring gender neutrality into custody law, it continues
to permeate family courts. While the decision in Young v. Hector is dis-
agreeable, at least it has created substantial public debate regarding custody
decisions and perhaps will provide an impetus for change.
The current best interests standard is properly directed because it fo-
cuses on children, but the application of that standard continues to perpetu-
ate gender bias and essentially ignore the children's perspective. 26 As di-
vorce rates continue to climb, however, it is children who will be most
affected by custody decisions.217 Now may be time to get the children in-
volved by asking for their preference. Young children are capable of making
important decisions for themselves.2"8 Regardless of whether children's in-
put is sought, trial judges should be required to make specific findings of
fact. Although appellate courts can only base their decisions on a "cold re-
cord," by demanding clearer reasons for custody decisions they may go a
long way toward uncovering trial judges' hidden gender biases, and can
therefore hold judges accountable for their decisions.
Whatever the solution, one thing is clear: the time has come to stop fo-
cusing on child custody as a competition between the parents and the gen-
214. Jacobs, supra note 26, at 901.
215. See McNeely, supra note 22, at 906. Ironically, an article appeared in the New York
Times on July 13, 1999, in which the author concluded "[Young v. Hector] is also powerful
evidence that society and the law have moved far past the presumption that the mother, unless
she is shown to be unfit, should automatically get custody." Petersen, supra note 11. However,
another article was probably more accurate: "[w]hat this case [Young] shows the most is that
the way things work now is a no-win situation for everyone." Oliphant, supra note 149 (quot-
ing Ellen Bravo, co-founder of "9 to 5," The National Association of Working Women.).
216. See Carpenter, supra note 20, at 57 (1996). See also McNeely, supra note 22, at 906
(arguing that family courts only give lip service to the needs of children).
217. See Swank, supra note 96, at 928.
218. See Kandel, supra note 51, at 365 (citing ERtC H. ERIMSON, IDENTITY: YOuTH AND
CRIsis (1968), for the proposition that children become developmentally ready to choose their
custodian by the age of six).
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der-based groups that support them. Now is the time to remove the focus
from mom and dad and return it where it belongs-on the children.
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